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I  Introduction: Choices in Designs of Pension Schemes  
 
We  examine  optimal  investment  performance  sharing  rules  between  future  pensioners  and 
sponsors/managers
1 of private pension schemes. Ideally, a performance sharing rule should align 
the interests of the sponsors and those of the pensioners, so that a sponsor seeking an investment 
strategy that maximizes his own utility also maximizes the utility of the pensioners. In reality, there 
are a variety of performance sharing rules currently in use that leave some conflicts of interests 
between the two parties and result in equilibrium investment strategies that depend on information 
available to the two parties and their relative bargaining power. 
In  many  European  countries, the UK  for instance, private  pension schemes  fall  into  two  main 
categories, defined benefits (DB) and defined contributions (DC). A pensioner in a DC scheme 
bears  the  full  performance  risk  of  the  fund  into  which  he  and  his  employer  make  regular 
contributions; the fund manager collects a fixed fee. By contrast, a pensioner in a DB company 
scheme bears no investment performance risk but takes a credit risk on the scheme’s sponsoring 
firm that guarantees the defined benefits. Typically, the defined benefits are a fraction of final 
salary multiplied by the number of years in employment. Such DB schemes are referred to more 
specifically  as  “final  salary  schemes”.  The  benefits  from  other  DB  schemes  may  be  based  on 
average  salary  or  other  more  stable  references.  The  DB  scheme  sponsor  must  make  up  any 
investment performance deficit with additional contributions but retains any performance surplus 
(usually by reducing or deferring contributions).
2 This performance risk is all the more visible in the 
UK and countries using IAS accounting standards now that new regulations
3 aimed at giving credit 
risk protection to DB pensioners
4 require that a DB fund surplus or deficit be reported by the 
sponsoring firm as a special item on its balance sheet. These regulations also require that the surplus 
or deficit be evaluated on a fair value basis as the mark to market value of the fund’s assets less the 
present value of the fund’s liabilities discounted at ‘AA’ Libor rates for matching maturities. Thus, 
                                                       
1 Although sponsors and fund managers are usually separate entities, we assume here that, within the performance 
sharing rules of a pension scheme, the fund manager acts for the benefit of the sponsor. We therefore refer to both 
parties as a single party. Performance sharing rules distribute the fund value between this party, referred to as either 
sponsor or manager, and the pensioners. We are not concerned here with the remuneration of the fund manager by 
the sponsor. 
2 See Blake (2006), pp. 101 102 and pp. 191 193. 
3 European regulations for private pension funds have multiple aims: harmonizing tax benefits to pensioners, giving 
greater flexibility in the choice of investment assets (introduction of equities, alternative investments, cross border 
investments), and, at the same time, greater transparency (mark to market of assets and sometimes of liabilities) 
and  greater  protection  of  the  pensioners  against  mismanagement  and  default  of  the  fund  sponsor  on  their 
commitments. In the UK where the private pension sector is generally more developed than in continental Europe, 
new regulations and accounting standards (FRS17) became effective on 01/01/2005 after a transition period of 
several years.    
4 The situation of a DB scheme pensioner is precarious if the sponsoring firm defaults on its obligations. In case of 
bankruptcy of the sponsor/employer, pensioners may not only lose their jobs but also find that their pension benefits 
are reduced. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
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the sponsoring firm’s financial standing is affected by the volatility of both assets and liabilities in 
its pension scheme.
5 
An  unintended  consequence  of  these  new  regulations  is  that  many  firms  found  that  their  DB 
schemes were becoming too risky and therefore stopped offering them to new employees, closed 
existing  schemes  to  new  contributions  and  induced  existing  members  to  transfer  to alternative 
schemes.
6 The remaining DB schemes – and they will still represent the majority of company 
schemes  in  the  UK  and  other  countries  for  some  years  to  come  –  are  now  managed  more 
conservatively. Asset allocations have been tilted away from equities towards long term bonds to 
match liabilities more closely and thus reduce surplus volatility. But long term expected returns are 
thereby reduced. Thus, the new regulations designed to provide greater security (lesser credit risk) 
to DB pensioners resulted in fewer DB schemes being offered and an increase in the cost of the 
remaining schemes for the sponsoring firms. They may have also contributed to the decline of the 
equity markets in the few years leading to their implementation. So, pension regulations not only 
affect the balance of risks between pensioners and sponsors but also affect investment strategies 
and, ultimately, global market performance.  
DB and DC schemes are but two instances in a wide spectrum of possible risk sharing rules and 
neither may be ideal from the point of view of pensioners. Some intermediate performance sharing 
rules may be more attractive to pensioners because they would align better their interests with those 
of  the  sponsor.  We  analyze  a  particular  class  of  performance  sharing  rules  that  guarantee  a 
minimum return to the pensioners. Some governments allow this type of performance sharing rule 
and regulate them to ensure that the sponsors are able to meet their commitments. An illustration is 
provided  by  Pensionskassen
7  in  Germany,  which  typically  are  life  insurance  companies. 
Pensionskassen guarantee at retirement date the contributions plus interest compounded at a fixed 
rate, currently set by law to at least 2.25% per year. Every year pensioners accumulate either this 
guaranteed  minimum  return  on  previous  contributions  or  90%  of  the  fund’s  annual  return,  if 
higher.
8 In future, the guaranteed minimum may be linked to inflation, but for the moment it is 
simply raised by a flat 1% to 3.25% to compensate for inflation.
9   
The German Pensionskassen scheme is an instance of a generic type of an intermediate performance 
sharing rule between DB and DC rules, namely, a DC scheme with a minimum guarantee for the 
pensioners and a share of the surplus for the sponsor. We shall not attempt to reflect the detailed 
                                                       
5 See Pension Act 2004 (UK). 
6 According to a report issued by Aon on the 31/08/2009, a new wave of DB scheme closures can be observed 
presently as the cost for the private sector of providing final salary pensions has increased. The top 200 schemes in 
the UK suffer from a deficit of £78bn, up from £73bn in the month before. See Inman (2009). 
7 For more information on Pensionskassen, see Klatt (2003), pp. 67 70. 
8 See § 4 (3) Verordnung über die Mindestbeitragsrückerstattung in der Lebensversicherung, introduced 04/04/2008 
(Germany).  
9 See Blome et al. (2007), p. 46. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
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workings  of  Pensionskassen,  nor  limit  ourselves  to  their  current  investment  strategies,  which 
currently  use  fixed  income  instruments  almost  exclusively.  Rather,  we  shall  examine  how  the 
choice of investment strategy by the fund manager depends on structure and choice of parameters of 
the performance sharing rule and, consequently, affects the benefits of pensioners. The onus is on 
the pension fund industry to propose and on regulators to approve performance sharing rules that 
benefit pensioners.  
Performance sharing rules for pension schemes and related dynamic investment strategies have 
been studied in a variety of contexts. In one group of studies the authors investigate regulatory 
schemes  with  defined  minimum  guarantees.  They  evaluate  the  advantages  of  introducing  such 
guaranteed returns and examine the corresponding optimal investment strategies. Deelstra et al. 
(2003) search for optimal investment strategies for a DC scheme with a fixed minimum guarantee 
in a continuous time framework. They develop an analytic approach in the context of a complete 
financial market and illustrate their results with a numerical analysis. Boulier et al. (2001) consider 
a DC scheme with a minimum guaranteed stochastic interest rate. They develop a quantitative 
method to determine an optimal dynamic allocation among three different asset classes: cash, long 
term bonds and stocks. Doskeland and Nordahl (2008) show that annual guarantees have a negative 
effect on the final wealth of the investor and that a lifetime guarantee is preferable, if a guarantee is 
required  at  all.  We  come  to  the  same  conclusion  in  this  paper.  Several  other  studies,  such  as 
Brennan (1993), analyze the effect of a minimum guarantee on investor’s welfare. He analyzes, 
inter alia, bonus policies with reversionary bonuses of life insurance companies and shows them to 
be inefficient. Jensen and Sorensen (2001) demonstrate that a guaranteed minimum return may lead 
to a significant expected utility loss measured with a CRRA utility function. Consiglio et al. (2006) 
present a model to compare portfolio performance under different policy structures for with profits 
funds. Hansen and Miltersen (2002) examine funds offering a guaranteed minimum rate of return 
and introduce a complex smooth surplus sharing rule between the investor and the fund that is fair 
to both.  
A second group of studies concentrates on the optimal design of pension fund schemes leading to 
optimal return profiles for investors. Some studies investigate how a minimum guarantee should be 
designed  optimally.  Deelstra  et  al.  (2004)  study  the  optimal  design  of  a  guarantee  in  a  DC 
framework. By means of optimal control theory they maximize the expected utility of the fund 
manager under the assumption of a power utility function but they do not provide numerical results. 
Doskeland and Nordahl (2008) also analyze how to optimally design traditional funds and pension 
funds  with  a  guaranteed  minimum  rate  of  return.  To  find  how  to  increase  investors’  welfare 
(measured with a certainty equivalent) they use numerical methods and find that, with a CRRA 
utility, they cannot justify the existence of a minimum guarantee. Pézier (2008) also finds that, with 
exponential utility functions, optimal portfolio returns are linear in asset returns; however, he finds 
that with power utilities, optimal portfolio returns may be convex, linear or concave in the risky ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
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asset return depending on the sensitivity of the local risk aversion coefficient to wealth and the 
risk/return characteristics of the risky asset.  
A  third  group  of  studies  focuses  on  the  optimal  management  of  pension  funds  with  dynamic 
investment strategies. A stochastic pension fund model is used by Cairns (1996) who considers a 
generalized constant proportion portfolio insurance to manage a pension fund in continuous time 
and gives numerical examples to show that a very good approximation to discrete time models is 
reached. For the funding level he also derives the stationary distribution. Martinelli and Milhau 
(2009) examine dynamic allocation strategies for pension funds to find an integrated model for 
asset liability  management.  They  find  that  the  cost  of  short term  funding  constraints  is 
unexpectedly low but the lack of dynamic risk management can be costly. Other studies compare 
the performance of static and dynamic investment strategies. Bertrand and Prigent (2005) analyze 
and compare two very common portfolio insurance strategies: an option based portfolio insurance 
(OBPI) and a constant proportion portfolio insurance (CPPI). They consider various criteria for 
their  comparison  and  conclude  that  there  is  no  dominant  strategy  either  state wisely  or 
stochastically to the first order. Zagst and Kraus (2008) compare the same two portfolio insurance 
methods but consider their stochastic dominance up to third order criteria. They derive parameter 
conditions that lead to a second or third order dominance of the CPPI strategy. 
In a recent study Amenc et al. (2009) examine the impact of regulatory and institutional frameworks 
on pension fund management and show the challenges European regulatory developments pose to 
pension funds. Their two main findings are that if regulators would tolerate short term risk, the 
pension system would be more stable and pension funds should further develop internal models to 
analyze  investment  strategies.  This  study  reveals  growing  concerns  about  the  influence  of 
regulations on the management of pension funds but, as seen in our literature overview, there are 
still  few  studies  on  what  could  be  considered  as  optimal  design  of  pension  plans.  Our  paper 
addresses this issue.  
The next two Sections describe our problem setting. In Section II we define four notional assets 
available for investment, denoted Cash, Bond, Equity and Market (a constant mix of Bond and 
Equity) and specify their price dynamics. In Section III we describe the yearly and cumulative 
performance  sharing  rules  we  want  to  compare.  We  also  describe  two  types  of  investment 
strategies: constant value mix (CM) investment strategies and constant proportionality portfolio 
insurance (CPPI) style strategies. To complete the setting, we specify the expected utility criterion 
used to assess investment performance from the points of view of pensioners and sponsors. Section 
IV presents the results of CM strategies under a yearly performance sharing rule; they reveal a sharp 
conflict of interest between pensioners and sponsors and poor results for both. Section V shows that 
a cumulative performance sharing rule alleviates this conflict and improves the results for both 
parties. Sections VI and VII revisit the sharing rules in IV and V but with CPPI style investment 
strategies. The main advantage of CPPI style strategies is to reduce the downside risk for both ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
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pensioners and fund managers. Under the cumulative performance sharing rule, there is no conflict 
of interest between these two parties and CPPI style strategies do not improve on the performance 
of the optimal CM strategy. But by reducing the risk of a loss for the fund manager they reduce the 
credit exposure of the pensioners. We conclude in Section VIII on the advantages of introducing 
new pension schemes with profit sharing rules intermediate between the traditional DB and DC 
schemes, provided they are suitably designed and supervised, and on the relative advantages of 
CPPI strategies over CM strategies in the presence of a liability constraint.  
 
II  Assets and Asset Price Dynamics 
 
We  define  four  notional  assets  for  investing  pension  contributions.  We  call  them  Cash,  Bond, 
Equity and Market. In the following we give brief introductions into the theory of the modeling of 
those assets and present our approaches to it. The overarching assumption in this section is that 
Brownian motions can be used to model the uncertainty in the dynamics of financial assets. We use 
Brownian motions in the subsequent subsections for modeling interest rates and equity prices.  
Interest Rate Modeling  
Vasicek (1977) proposes a time homogeneous interest rate model. He assumes that a spot rate, r, 
follows an Ornstein Uhlenbeck process under a real world probability measure, 
                                         (1) 
 where r0 ,  , b, and σr are positive constants and Wr is a Brownian process. 
We calibrate the Vasicek model on the yields of the 30 year German government Bund, the 5 year 
BoBL
10 and the 6 month Treasury Bill with daily data from January 2000 until June 2008.
11,12 The 
corresponding calibrated parameters a, b and σr are associated with the modified durations (MD) of 
these  instruments  which  are,  approximately,  15  years,  4.5  years  and  6 month  respectively.
13 
Matching parameters for intermediate MDs are obtained by interpolation. We also find a correlation 
of 0.5 between the yields of the long term bond and the 6 month Bill. These parameters are plotted 
in Figure 1. Although the O U process allows negative yields, the probability of a negative yield is 
negligible with these parameters.
14 
                                                       
10 Bundesobligation issued with 5 years to maturity. 
11 The data were downloaded from Bloomberg. 
12 January 2000 is when German bonds were converted from Deutsche Mark to Euros and interest rates became 
subject to ECB rather than Bundesbank policies. Former data would therefore be less relevant.  
13 The model calibration was conducted with Maximum Likelihood estimation. 
14 All calculations and simulations in this study are conducted with Matlab R2008a. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
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Figure 1: Interpolated Vasicek Model Parameters 
(Right scale for parameter  , left scale for parameters b and σr) 
An O U process for an instantaneous rate could be used as a single factor model for the entire yield 
curve. However, such modeling would lack realism and flexibility. In our implementation it would 
grossly underestimate the volatility of long term bonds and imply perfect correlation between long 
term and short term yields.  
We prefer a more empirical approach to the modeling of returns on a portfolio of bonds. We assume 
that the fund manager always takes positions in notional par bonds with  yield r and modified 
duration MD so that over a short period dt  the return on a bond position is to first order terms is: 
         
   
  
               .           (2) 
where Pt is the bond price at t. 
We use this formula to define Cash returns with MD = 1 and Bond returns with MD = 15 when the 
fund’s remaining life is greater or equal to 15 years and MD equal to the remaining fund’s life 
during the last 15 years. In other words, the Cash and Bond assets are notional instruments with 
defined durations such that Cash corresponds to a one year government Bill and Bond approximates 
first a 30 year par Bund and then, during the last 15 years of the fund, approximates shorter term ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
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par Bunds or BoBLs. Adjusting the MD of the Bond asset with the time to maturity of the fund 
reduces the uncertainty in the cumulative performance of the Bond asset.  
Equity Market Modeling 
For the Equity asset, we assume that the price St follows a geometric Brownian motion 
                                         (3) 
where S0,  , and σs  are positive constants and Ws is a Brownian process. Over a time interval dt, the 
Equity return is 
                        
 
    
             .    (4) 
We calibrate the Equity model parameters with daily data for the German DAX equity index from 
June 1980 until June 2008.
15,16 The estimated yearly parameters are   = 0.0904 and σs = 0.2084.  
Finally, we define a single risky asset as a constant value mix of 60% Bond and 40% Equity. We 
call it the ‘Market’ asset. Indeed, the mix so defined has about the highest Sharpe ratio achievable 
with the Bond and Equity assets. 
Equity was not significantly correlated with Cash and Bond during the period January 2000 to June 
2008; we therefore take the Brownians Ws and Wr to be independent. A correlation between Bond 
and Equity performance could easily be introduced to reflect different circumstances. 
Although we use historical data to calibrate our chosen price processes for our chosen assets, it does 
not necessarily mean that our choice of representative assets is ideal and that the corresponding 
processes and parameters lead to good forecasts of future returns. However we found that these 
assets and processes are sufficiently representative to validate our general conclusions. Sensitivity 
analyses to the choice of parameters show that realistic variations would not change our conclusions 
about optimal performance sharing rules and the relative merits of CM and CPPI strategies. We 
evaluate the performance of a fund with alternative performance sharing rules and CM and CPPI 
strategies by simulating 10,000 paths of monthly Cash, Bond, Equity and Market returns. This 
number of simulations proved to be sufficient to yield stable results. 
III  Performance Sharing Rules, Investment Strategies and Preference Criteria 
 
We assume that 40 equal yearly contributions are made into a Fund (the ‘Fund’).
17 It does not 
matter for this study whether the contributions are made by a cohort of members of the scheme (the 
                                                       
15 The data were downloaded from Bloomberg. 
16 The DAX index is a total return index including dividends. 
17 Our analysis could easily be extended to irregular contributions and early retirement from the Fund. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
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‘Pensioner’)
18, their employer, the state or jointly by several contributors. These contributions are 
immediately  and  fully  invested  in  the  Fund.  The  Fund  manager  (the  ‘Manager’)  guarantees  a 
minimum return on the contributions, or Floor, plus participation to the performance of the Fund if 
that participation exceeds the guaranteed minimum return. In reality some management fees would 
probably be charged either directly on the contributions or on the current value of assets under 
management, or a combination of both.
19 For the sake of simplicity, we do not model any specific 
fee arrangement but recognize that the Manager will require a satisfactory return for sponsoring a 
scheme. 
The  performance  sharing  rule  is  characterized  by  two  parameters:  α,  the  guaranteed  minimum 
return on contributions and β, the percentage participation in the performance of the Fund. We 
understand that German Pensionskassen apply the sharing rule to yearly returns in the following 
way. Denote by Vt  the value of the Fund at the beginning of year t before the yearly contribution ct 
is received, Ft  the guaranteed minimum value, or Floor, for the Pensioner, and Rt the share of the 
Fund value already attributed to the Pensioner. Then, at the beginning of year t   1, before a new 
contribution is made, the value of the Fund attributed to the Pensioner is 
                      a               β                       (5) 
the value attributed to the Manager, Mt, is 
Mt   Vt – Rt          (6) 
and the new value of the Floor is 
Ft 1    Ft   ct   1   α         (7) 
with, at inception, R1   V1   F1   0. 
The value of the Floor at any time can be calculated from the contributions up to that point. For 
example, with uniform contributions c per year from t   1 to t   T, the Floor at T   1 is: 
                   1         1 
   
         (8) 
On the other hand, the value of the Fund and the shares attributed to the Pensioner and the Manager 
for t > 1 are stochastic variables depending on investment performance. 
                                                       
18 For simplicity we prefer to refer to the members of the scheme as Pensioner rather than ‘future Pensioners’, 
members, or investors. 
19 A realistic fee could be about 0.75% per year of assets under management. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
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According to this yearly performance sharing rule (YPSR), the Manager provides the Pensioner 
with a yearly in the money put option and a fraction β of a yearly call of same strike as the put on 
the performance of the Fund in return for a fraction  1 – β  of that call. This amounts to a series of 
cliquet options
20 with variable known strikes on the value of the Fund itself influenced by the 
choice of investment strategy. It could be unprofitable for the Manager unless he finds a suitably 
low risk and high yielding asset to invest in. 
Alternatively, the same Floor could be guaranteed to the Pensioner with the excess cumulative 
(rather than yearly) performance of the Fund above the Floor being shared between the Pensioner 
and the Manager in the proportions β :  1 – β . That is, one could define the value of the Fund 
attributed to the Pensioner at the beginning of year t   1, before a new contribution is made as: 
                      β  a                0     (9) 
with Ft 1 defined as before. 
Thus the Manager would provide a single 40 year American style put option with the monotonically 
increasing Floor defined by (7) rather than a more costly series of yearly put options.
21 This might 
induce the Manager to seek riskier investments with correspondingly higher expected returns and 
the pension scheme could, on balance, become more attractive to the Pensioner. We call this sharing 
rule  the  cumulative  performance  sharing  rule  (CPSR)  as  opposed  to  the  previous  yearly 
performance sharing rule (YPSR). 
Among all imaginable investment strategies using Cash, Bond, Equity and Market assets, we focus 
on CM and CPPI style strategies.
22. Each strategy of either type is characterized by the parameter ω 
defining the allocation to the risky asset, the rest being allocated to Cash. With CM strategies ω is 
the proportion of the total Fund value allocated to the risky asset. The Fund is rebalanced every 
month  to  maintain  ω  constant.  Many  traditional  pension  Fund  management  strategies  are 
approximately  CM  strategies  because  pension  Fund  trustees  often  stipulate  narrow  ranges  for 
allocations to major asset classes. CM strategies are contrarian strategies. Every month some of the 
risky asset is bought (sold) if it has underperformed (outperformed) the return on Cash. We use 
alternatively Bond, Equity and Market for the risky asset. 
But for the Manager the risk of providing a minimum guaranteed return to the pensioners could be 
excessive if he were to invest a fixed fraction of the Fund in a risky asset according to a CM 
                                                       
20 When the regular coupons of a bond are defined as options, these options are traditionally referred to as cliquet 
options.  
21 Pensioners wishing to collect early the value of their Fund could exercise this put although one would expect that 
a  secondary  market  would  develop  offering  better  prices,  as  it  has  been  the  case  for  many  other  long term 
investment products. 
22 On the definition of CM and CPPI strategies, see Perold and Sharpe (1988). ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
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strategy. If the risky asset performs badly the Fund value could approach zero and the Manager 
would have to pay any minimum guaranteed return out of his own resources. To reduce this risk, 
the Manager could find it preferable to manage dynamically his allocation to the risky asset so as to 
reduce  it  to  zero  if  the  Fund  value  falls  to  the  minimum  guaranteed  return.  In  general,  the 
performance of a dynamic strategy depends on the ability of the Manager to forecast the volatility 
and other dynamics of the risky asset he chooses. Modeling such capabilities to decide on the best 
choice of dynamic strategy would be complex and would reflect the timing and asset selection skills 
of  the  Manager.  Instead,  we  consider  a  systematic  CPPI  style  strategy,  independent  of  the 
forecasting skills of the Manager. A CPPI strategy ensures that a minimum performance, or Floor – 
typically the minimum guaranteed return   is achieved by allocating to a risky asset a constant 
proportion (or multiplier) of the excess of the Fund value above the Floor, the excess is called 
Buffer. By analogy with the CM strategy, we denote the CPPI multiplier ω. We use exclusively 
Market for the risky asset and rebalance the Fund at monthly intervals. Should the Buffer become 
nil or negative, the Fund would be entirely invested in the relevant risk free asset.
23 We implement 
the CM and the CPPI strategies both for a yearly and a cumulative performance sharing rule. 
On a yearly basis (YPSR), the Buffer Bs for the CPPI strategy at time s, t  ≤ s < t   1, is 
Bs    Vs – Ds          (10) 
where, using previous notations, Vs is the value of the Fund at time s and Ds is the discounted value 
of the minimum due to the Pensioner at year t   1 before a new contribution is made, that is 
                      1                  
 
                 (11) 
where rt is the Cash rate at time s. The term in square brackets on the r.h.s. of (11) is the new Floor 
value at year t   1 (before a new contribution ct 1 is made) plus the excess above the Floor already 
attributed to the Pensioner at year t.
24 At the end of the year a new Buffer is calculated and the CPPI 
process is repeated. The Manager must make up any negative Buffer value to deliver the minimum 
benefits guaranteed to the Pensioner. If the leverage ω is not large, it is improbable that the Buffer 
would ever become negative.  
On a cumulative basis (CPSR), the Buffer is defined as in (26) but the discount value Ds at time s, 
t ≤ s < t   1, is defined as 
                       1            
               (12) 
                                                       
23 See Black and Perold (1992) and Perold and Sharpe (1988). 
24 In reality, for risk free discounting and investment during the period (t, t + 1) we should use the Treasury Bill 
maturing at t, but for simplicity and with only a small loss of accuracy we use Cash, that is a one year Treasury 
Bill.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
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which  is  the  discounted  value  of  the  minimum  guaranteed  to  investors  at  maturity  T  from 
contributions already made at time t. The risk free rate r is chosen as the relevant Bond yield (as 
defined before). Should the Buffer become nil or negative, the Fund would be fully invested at that 
yield until maturity.
25 
For the evaluation of the investment strategies we rely on utility analysis and calculate the certainty 
equivalents (CE) of the CM and CPPI strategies for both the Manager and the Pensioner. Each CE 
should be interpreted as the minimum amount for sure that the beneficiary would be willing to 
receive at maturity instead of facing an uncertain terminal value. A CE is a primitive concept that 
encapsulates the risk attitude of the beneficiary. To evaluate CEs systematically we assume the risk 
attitudes  of  the  Pensioner  and  of  the  Manager  can  be  characterized  by  exponential  utility 
functions.
26  
                     1        
  
    
       (13) 
The single parameter λ, a local coefficient of risk tolerance, is usually in a range from 10% to 25% 
of the net worth of the beneficiary. For illustration we assume λP = 40 for the Pensioner and λM = 15 
for the Manager.
27  
Thus, the CEs are functions of the sharing rule type, its parameters α and β, the coefficients of risk 
tolerance of the beneficiaries, and the relevant investment strategy parameter ω. We assume that the 
Manager always adopts the investment strategy, ω*(α, β) that maximizes his CE. It should be of 
interest to the pension industry and to regulators to find out which choice of sharing rule parameters 
α and β maximizes the CE of the Pensioner in these circumstances. We shall say that a triplet 
                                                       
25 In reality, for risk free discounting and investment between time s and maturity T, one should use the zero 
coupon of maturity (T – s). In practice and with only a small loss of accuracy we use the Bond of relevant modified 
duration as defined in Section II. 
26 More general utility functions could be used, in particular, utility functions that would justify the Pensioner’s 
desire for a guaranteed minimum value. Exponential utilities can be regarded as a first approximation with constant 
risk tolerance to more general utility functions with risk tolerance varying as a function of wealth. So far the 
provision of minimum guarantees for pension funds, or of defined benefits, or the imposition of constraints on the 
riskiness of the assets has more to do with governments wanting to ensure that pensions are safe than with the 
recognition of pensioners’ risk attitudes.  
27 Various empirical studies, for example Barsky et al. (1997) show that there is considerable heterogeneity in the 
risk  attitude  of  individuals;  they  find  coefficients  of  risk  tolerance  ranging  from  1/15  to  half  of  net  worth. 
Bodie/Kane/Marcus in their widely used “Investments” textbook (McGraw Hill, 8
th ed, 2009) use a risk tolerance 
coefficient of 1/4 in their illustrations. Pensioners making 40 yearly contributions of one unit each might expect a 
final pension value of around 120 and if that is half of their total net worth then λP = 40 would represent 1/6 of their 
net worth. We choose λM = 15 for the Manager to correspond to 1/6 of his equity value as well. Indeed, in a steady 
state situation, with one Pensioner in each age group from 40 years before retirement to retirement, total AUM 
would be around 1800; with fees of 1% of AUM and expenses of 0.5%, net income would be 9 per year and equity 
would have to be 90 for an ROE of 10%. Our main conclusions would not be greatly affected even if these figures 
were changed by as much as 50%.   ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
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(α , β, ω) defines a plan, a triplet (α, β, ω∗) a Manager’s optimal plan and a triplet (α∗, β∗, ω∗) a 
Pensioner’s optimal plan. 
IV  Performance with Constant Mix Strategies and Yearly Performance Sharing 
Rule  
 
Figure 2 shows probability densities of the Fund value a year after the last of 40 units of yearly 
contributions is made and the Manager has implemented a CM strategy either all in Cash, all in 
Bond, or with ω = 30% in Market (and 70% in Cash). With the chosen asset price dynamics, these 
densities do not have simple analytical forms; they are obtained by simulating 10,000 asset return 
scenarios. Their main statistics and those of an All Equity investment are reported in the second 
column of Table I under the heading ‘Fund’. 
































Figure 2: Final Fund Value Distributions under Various CM Strategies and YPSR ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
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Table I: Final Performance with Alternative CM Strategies under YPSR 
The final value of the Fund is shared between Pensioner and Manager according to a Yearly 
Performance Sharing Rule with guaranteed return α as shown and β = 90% 
 
   
Min Return 
α  α  α  α = 2.25% 
Min Return 
α α α α = 3.00% 
Min Return 
α α α α = 3.75% 
Statistics  Fund  Pension.  Manager  Pension.  Manager  Pension.  Manager 
Floor    65.22    77.66    92.97   





































































































































The All Cash investment leads to an approximately normal distribution with low expected return 
(86.18) and low standard deviation (6.38). Both All Bond and 30% Market investment strategies 
yield also approximately normal distributions but with higher expected values (108.22 and 107.38, 
respectively); the All Bond investment is also less risky than the All Cash investment whereas the 
30% Market investment is more risky (standard deviation of 4.72, 6.38 and 13.44, respectively). 
The  All  Equity  investment,  on  the  other  hand,  yields  a  highly  positively  skewed  final  value 
distribution with much higher expected value (406.88) and standard deviation (622.37). ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
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How these final Fund values are shared between the Manager and the Pensioner under the YPSR is 
critical.  The  key  observation  is  that  all  of  these  investment  strategies  are  unattractive  to  the 
Manager. There are only three combinations with positive yet insufficient expected returns:
28 the 
30% Market investment strategy with α = 2.25%, the All Cash investment strategy with α = 2.25% 
and,  marginally  positive,  the  All  Cash  investment  strategy  with  α = 3.00%.  Moreover,  these 
combinations are the least attractive to the Pensioner. It may surprise at first that the All Bond 
investment strategy, which leads to the least risky final Fund value distribution, is less attractive to 
Managers than the All Cash and the 30% Market strategies. The reason is that the yearly returns of 
the Bond strategy are highly volatile and therefore less attractive for the Manager. Clearly, the 
interests of the Pensioner and the Manager are in conflict and Managers cannot extract a sufficient 
return to sponsor these schemes. 
For  a  more  comprehensive  comparison  of  the  attractiveness  of  alternative  sharing  rules  and 
investment strategies, we calculate their respective CEs for the Pensioner and the Manager. The CEs 
of the Pensioner and the Manager with the All Cash, All Bond and 30%−Market CM strategies are 
shown  in  Table  II.  For  each  pension  plan  we  calculate  the  average  utility      
 
     over  
n = 10,000 scenarios and calculate the corresponding CEs using the exponential utility function 
                  n 1  
  
   .        (14) 
As expected, all CEs are lower than the means reported in Table I for the corresponding plans 
because of uncertainties in terminal values. The CEs of the Manager are negative except for the All 
Cash strategy and the 30% Market strategy when α = 2.25%. They are most negative with the All 
Bond strategy because of the relatively high volatility of Bond on a yearly basis. The CEs of the 
Pensioner are always above the Floor but unattractive with the All Cash strategy compared to the 
30% Market strategy. They are highest for the All Bond strategy that is the least attractive from the 
Manager’s perspective.  
                                                       
28 As explained in the previous footnote, the Manager would look for an expected profit of around 9 or more. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
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Table II: Certainty Equivalents of CM Strategies All Cash, All Bond and 30%− − − −Market under 
YPSR 
Yearly Performance Sharing Rule with Pensioner participation β = 90% in all cases 
 
We therefore focus our attention on CM strategies with Cash and Market assets and explore the 
continuum of CE outcomes with Market allocations from 0% to 40% and guaranteed minimum rates 
of return from 2.25% to 3.75%. In all cases the Pensioner participation is 90%. The results are 
plotted in Figure 3 for the Pensioner and Figure 4 for the Manager. 
The CE of the Pensioner is always well above the Floor. It increases moderately with the increase in 
the guaranteed minimum and it increases markedly with increasing Market allocation, especially if 
the guaranteed minimum is high. On the other hand, the CE of the Manager is positive only for very 
low  Market  allocations.  It  decreases  moderately  with  an  increasing  guaranteed  minimum.  It 
increases  slightly  with  small  market  allocations,  reaches  a  maximum  with  about  5%  to  10% 
allocated to Market and then decreases more and more rapidly with higher Market allocations. This 
confirms  the  obvious  conflict  of  interest  between  the  investment  strategy  preferences  of  the 
Pensioner and the Manager. The former, being protected by the Floor, prefers the higher expected 
return brought by higher Market allocations whereas the latter, providing the downside protection, 
prefers only a small Market allocation.  
 
Min Return 
α α α α = 2.25% 
Min Return 
α α α α = 3.00% 
Min Return 
α α α α = 3.75% 
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Figure 4: Certainty Equivalent of the Manager with Cash/Market CM Strategies under YPSR 
This conflict of interest could be reduced by modifying the sharing rule in favor of the Manager. 
This would induce him to adopt an investment strategy with a larger allocation to Market, thus 
benefiting the Pensioner as well. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the CEs of the Pensioner and the 
α 
ω 




 ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
Copyright © 2009. Scheller & Pézier. All Rights Reserved.  19
Manager as a function of the Pensioner participation, β, when the guaranteed minimum rate of 
return is α = 2.25%. The Pensioner always prefers both a greater participation, and a greater Market 
allocation as shown by the constant Market allocation curves in Figure 5. The Manager, on the other 
hand, prefers a lower participation going to the Pensioner, but his optimal level of Market allocation 
varies as a function of Pensioner participation. We see in Figure 6 that the Manager’s optimal 
Market allocation is near zero when Pensioner participation is near 100%, but increases to near 40% 
when Pensioner participation decreases from 100% to 55%. In an oligopoly where the Manager 
would be able to optimize his choice of investment strategy for his own benefit and with little 
regards for the Pensioner, the Pensioner’s CE would evolve as shown by the Manager’s optimal 
allocation curve in Figure 5. It remains very flat with highs around 88 for β = 100% and β = 55% 
and a low around 85 for β = 80%. An adequate performance for the Manager would be 10 or above 
and would be attainable only if Pensioner participation were no more than 75%. On the other hand, 
if the Manager had to compete with others for the custom of the Pensioner, he would be able to 
reduce their upside participation down to 75% necessary for a viable business but Pensioners could 
force the Manager to allocate 30% to the Market asset because it would cost Manager little to do so. 
Thus, the CEs would be at least 10 for the Manager and close to 95 for the Pensioner. That would be 
markedly better than under the current rule for Pensionskassen with a Pensioner participation of 
90% which makes the business unviable for the Manager and still poor value (CE around 87) for the 
Pensioner. It remains that a Pensioner’s CE of about 95 under the YPSR (α = 2.25%, β = 75%, ω = 
30%) is still poor compared to what can be achieved with a CPSR rule as we shall see next. 
 
Figure 5: Certainty Equivalent of the Pensioner as a Function of the Pensioner’s Participation 
and the Market Asset Allocation under YPSR 
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Figure 6: Certainty Equivalent of the Manager as a Function of the Pensioner’s Participation 
and the Market Asset Participation under YPSR 
V  Performance with Constant Mix Strategies and Cumulative Performance 
Sharing Rule  
 
We found in Section IV that the YPSR produces final value distributions for the Pensioner that are 
well above the guaranteed minimum value, or Floor. In fact, due to frequent participations in the 
yearly Fund performance, these distributions for All Cash, All Bond and 30% Market CM strategies 
are  close  to  normality.  If  instead,  one  applies  a  CPSR  with  same  Floor  and  same  Pensioner 
participation,  the  corresponding  final  value  distributions  for  the  Pensioner  are  truncated 
distributions easily obtained from the final Fund value distributions in Figure 2. The Pensioner 
obtains 90% (or generally the participation β) of the final value above the Floor, if any, or the Floor 
when the final value of the Fund does not reach the Floor. The Manager obtains 10% (or generally 
(1 – β)) of the excess of the final value of the Fund above the Floor, if any, or pays out to the 
Pensioner  the  shortfall  when  the  final  value  of  the  Fund  does  not  reach  the  Floor.  These 
distributions are generally more attractive to the Manager and less so to the Pensioner than the 
distributions with matching investment strategies under the YPSR as we can see from Table III 
which  should  be  compared  with  Table  II  for  YPRS. We  also  add  in  Table III  an  All  Market 
investment strategy which is now attractive for the Manager.  
We observe only small differences between YPSR and CPSR for an All Cash investment strategy, 
especially with low levels of α, because it is almost guaranteed to produce low volatility results 
greater than the guaranteed minimum return. On the other hand, the All Bond and the 30% Market 
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strategies become more attractive to the Manager and less so to the Pensioner. That is because the 
Bond asset has low final uncertainty (although it has relatively high yearly volatility). But the best 
CM strategy among the four displayed in Table IV is clearly the All Market strategy. It is best both 
for the Pensioner and the Manager. It is also the only strategy that may appear sufficiently attractive 
for a Manager to sponsor such a scheme. The final Fund value distribution is plotted in Figure 7. 
The only drawback from the Pensioner’s perspective is that under the All Market strategy there is a 
risk that the final Fund value does not exceed the Floor and therefore the Pensioner takes a credit 
risk on the Manager.  



























Figure 7: Final Fund Value Distribution with All Market Strategy under CPSR 
Table III: Certainty Equivalents of CM Strategies All Cash, All Bond and 30% Market under 
CPSR 
Cumulative Performance Sharing Rule with Pensioner participation β = 90% in all cases 
  Min Return 
α = 2.25% 
Min Return 
α  = 3.00% 
Min Return 
α  = 3.75% 
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Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the CEs of the Pensioner and the Manager for CM strategies with Cash 
and Market assets with Market allocations from 0% to 100% and guaranteed minimum rate of 
return  on  contributions  from  2.25%  to  3.75%.  The  Pensioner  participation  is  still  90%.  These 
figures with the CPSR correspond to Figure 3 and Figure 4 with the YPSR. 
As  before,  the  CE  of  the  Pensioner  increases  moderately  with  the  increase  in  the  guaranteed 
minimum and it increases markedly  with increasing Market allocation. But now the CE of the 
Manager  also  increases  with  increasing  market  allocations  in  the  range  ω =  0%  to  100%.  It 
decreases  moderately  with  an  increasing  guaranteed  minimum,  but  remains  mostly  positive. 
Therefore there is still some conflict of interest between the Pensioner and the Manager on the 
guaranteed minimum return, but both prefer higher Market allocations. Maximum CEs would be 
reached for allocations to Market beyond 100%, if the Manager were allowed to cash leverage his 
investments. We conclude that under CPSR the All Market investment strategy, if cash leverage is 
not allowed, offers the best achievable CEs for both the Pensioner and the Manager. The CEs of the 
Pensioner  (above  136)  are  greatly  superior  to  those  achievable  with  a  YPSR.  The  CE  of  the 
Manager is above 10 when α = 2.25% and could be kept above 10 for larger minimum guarantees if 




















Figure 8: Certainty Equivalent of the Pensioner with Cash/Market CM Strategies under CPSR 
α  ω 
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Figure 9: Certainty Equivalent of the Manager with Cash/Market CM Strategies under CPSR  
  
VI  Performance with CPPI Strategies and Yearly Performance Sharing Rule 
 
We  now  consider  CPPI  style  investment  strategies  using  the  Cash  and  Market  assets  only. 
Specifically, the amount invested in the Market asset every month is a constant multiplier, ω, of the 
Buffer, the difference between the value of the Fund and the discounted minimum value of the 
benefits already promised to the Pensioner. The rest of the Fund is invested in Cash. This CPPI 
strategy is first used with the YPSR. The distributions of final Fund values are plotted in Figure 10 
for a leverage ω = 2. There is one distribution for each of the three guaranteed minimum returns on 
contribution, α = 2.25%, 3.00% and 3.75%, because the investment strategy now depends on the 
level of the Floor. The expected final values are seen to decrease slightly with increasing Floors and 
so do the standard deviations. This is confirmed by the statistics in Table IV in the columns headed 
‘Fund’. Clearly, the higher the Floor, the smaller the Buffer, and the lower the average investment 
in the Market asset. But the Buffer remains always very small so that all three distributions have 
approximately the same shape and statistics as the All Cash distribution examined in Section IV 
(Figure 2 and Table I); the expected values and standard deviations are only marginally greater than 
with the All Cash strategy. 
The  same  conclusions  can  be  drawn  for  the  shares  of  the  final  Fund  value  attributed  to  the 
Pensioner  and  the  Manager  when  the  Manager’s  participation  to  the  upside  is  β =  90%.  The 
corresponding  statistics  are  also  reported  in  Table  IV  (columns  headed  ‘Pens.’  and  ‘Man.’, 
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and those for the Manager decrease. The standard deviations of these distributions are small so that 
the corresponding CEs, shown in Table V, are barely below the relevant expected values. For ease 
of comparison, Table V repeats the results of the All Cash investment strategy of Section IV, which 
corresponds  to  a  leverage  ω  =  0,  and  adds  the  cases  ω =  5  and  ω = 10.  As  ω  increases  both 
Pensioner’s and Manager’s CEs increase marginally; there is no conflict of interest. However, there 
is conflict of interest on the choice of minimum guarantee and, in all cases, the CEs of the Manager 
are too low to make the business viable under the YPSR. 


























Minimum return alpha 2.25%
Minimum return alpha 3.00%
Minimum return alpha 3.75%
 
Figure 10: Final Fund Value Distributions with CPPI Strategy (ω = 2) under YPSR 
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Table IV: Final Performance with CPPI Strategy (ω = 2) under YPSR 
The final value of the Fund is shared between Pensioners and Manager according to a Yearly 
Performance Sharing Rule with guaranteed return α as shown and β = 90% 
 
  Min Return 
α = 2.25% 
Min Return 
α = 3.00% 
Min Return 
α = 3.75% 




















































Table V: Certainty Equivalents of CPPI Strategies under YPSR 
Pensioners yearly surplus participation β = 90% in all cases 
 
A more complete picture of CEs for both Pensioner and Manager as a function of the minimum 
guaranteed rate α (from 2.25% to 3.75%) and the leverage ω (from 0 to 10) is given in Figure 11 
and Figure 12. The Pensioners surplus participation is 90% in all cases. These figures should be 
compared to Figure 3 and Figure 4 with CM strategies. 
  Min Return 
α  = 2.25% 
Min Return 
α  = 3.00% 
Min Return 
α  = 3.75% 
Multiplier  Pension.  Manager  Pension.  Manager  Pension.  Manager 
ω = 0 
ω = 5 


















 9.84 ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
Copyright © 2009. Scheller & Pézier. All Rights Reserved.  26






























Figure 12: Certainty Equivalent of the Manager with CPPI Strategies under YPSR 
Because there is little if any conflict of interest between Manager and Pensioner about seeking a 
high investment leverage, there is little room for improving the Pensioner’s CE by modifying the 
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profitable investment strategy. Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the CEs of the Pensioner and the 
Manager  under  a  CPPI  strategy  as  a  function  of  the  Pensioner’s  participation,  β,  when  the 
guaranteed minimum rate of return is α = 2.25%. In an oligopoly, the Manager would maximize his 
own CE by choosing the optimal ω. That optimal leverage is in the region of ω = 10 when β is less 
than 85% but then decreases to reach 5 when β reaches 97% and drops below 5 when beta reaches 
100%. Correspondingly, the Pensioner’s CE reaches a maximum of about 89 when β = 96%. But 
again, to make the plan viable for the Manager, say with a CE greater than 10, pension authorities 
should reduce the Pensioner’s upside participation in the Fund performance to β = 75% or less, in 
which case the CE of the Pensioner under a CPPI strategy becomes inferior to the CE under a CM 
strategy with the Market asset. In a competitive market, the Pensioner might push the Manager to 
increase the multiplier ω to increase his CE. We conclude that if pension authorities want to design 
viable pension schemes with guaranteed minimum return on contributions and a YPSR, they should 
keep the guaranteed minimum return low (well below risk free rates) and, assuming our parameters, 
offer an upside performance participation to the Pensioner of no more than 75%, then the Manager 
is likely to adopt a CM investment strategy with around 30% invested in the Market asset (the risky 
asset mix with maximum Sharpe ratio) and 70% in Cash as we found in Section IV. CPPI strategies 
are not preferable under the YPSR. 
 
 Figure 13: Certainty Equivalent of the Pensioner with CPPI Strategies as a Function of the 
Pensioner’s Participation and the Leverage under YPSR 
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Figure 14: Certainty Equivalent of the Manager with CPPI Strategies as a Function of the 
Pensioner’s Participation and the Leverage under YPSR 
VII  Performance with CPPI Strategies and Cumulative Performance Sharing Rule 
 
We now investigate the use of CPPI style investment strategies with the CPSR using exclusively the 
Cash and Market assets as before. The CEs of the Pensioner and the Manager are shown in Table 
VI for a selection of leverage factors from ω = 0 to ω = 10. In all cases the Pensioner participation 
is β = 90%. Table VI should be compared to Table III for CM strategies with CPSR. When ω = 0, 
we have an All Cash strategy showing the same results as in Table III for the corresponding All 
Cash investment. As we observed before, this plan is unattractive for the Manager, especially when 
the guaranteed minimum return is high. 
As ω increases, the average investment in the Market asset increases towards a 100% self imposed 
no cash leverage  ceiling; both the Manager’s and the  Pensioner’s  CEs increase  rapidly  at  first, 
especially when the guaranteed minimum return is low, and then reach a plateau. The reason is 
simple. At first, the size of the Buffer is limited by the value of the Fund; then it is limited by the 
no cash leveraging constraint. When ω increases, the average amount invested in the Market asset 
increases. When ω = 1, the average investment in the Market asset is about 43% of the Fund value, 
whereas when ω = 2, it reaches 87%. Since we found in Section V that the All Market investment 
strategy is superior to all other CM strategies with lesser allocations to the Market asset, we can 
therefore expect the CPPI strategies with high ω to approach but never exceed the performance of 
the All Market strategy. This is what Table VII shows. With α = 2.25% and ω = 10, the CEs of the 
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Pensioner  and  the  Manager  are  135.48  and  10.17  respectively,  which  comes  close  to  the 
corresponding CEs of 136.64 and 10.23 with the All Market investment strategy (see bottom row of 
Table III). With larger guaranteed minimum returns on contribution, the Buffers are smaller and the 
CPPI strategies run more distant seconds to the All Market strategy. The CEs of the Manager drop 
below 10 but could be restored at that level by reducing the Pensioner’s upside participation below 
90%. 
Table VI: Certainty Equivalents of CPPI Strategies under CPSR  
Cumulative Performance Sharing Rule with Pensioner participation β = 90% in all cases 
 
A fuller picture of CE variations as a function of the leverage ω from 0 to 20 and α from 2.25% to 
3.75% is given in Figure 15 for the Pensioner and Figure 16 for the Manager. There is little gain to 
be found by increasing ω beyond 5. At that leverage level, both the Pensioner and the Manager lose 
if the guaranteed minimum return on contributions is increased because it reduces the Buffer. Only 
at values of ω well below 1 does the raising of the guaranteed minimum return increase slightly the 
Pensioner’s CE.  
So, under CPSR, a CPPI strategy with a leverage ω = 5 performs almost as well as the All Market 
strategy. The main advantage of the CPPI strategy is that the probability of the Buffer becoming 
negative  is  negligible;  therefore  the  Pensioner  takes  no  material  credit  risk  on  the  Manager 
compared to the small credit risk he takes under the All Market investment strategy. 
  Min Return 
α = 2.25% 
Min Return 
α = 3.00% 
Min Return 
α = 3.75% 
CM Strategy  Pension.  Manager  Pension.  Manager  Pension.  Manager 
ω = 0 
ω = 2 
ω = 4 
ω = 6 
ω = 8 
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VI  Conclusions 
 
There  is  room  for  new types  of investment  performance sharing  rules between  pensioners  and 
scheme sponsors. In many countries defined benefit pension schemes that still represent the bulk of 
employers’ schemes are now wound down because the risks have become too high for the sponsors. 
Individuals are still encouraged by governments, in the form of various tax incentives, to make 
provisions for their retirement, but with defined contribution schemes they bear the full investment 
risk  and  may  not  be  well  equipped  to  make  the  appropriate  investment  choices.  In  these 
circumstances,  it  would  seem  appropriate  for  the  pension  industry  to  suggest  and  for  pension 
authorities to approve intermediate schemes between defined benefits and defined contributions that 
would  promise  some  degree  of  security  to  future  pensioners  together  with  attractive  expected 
returns  well  above  the  risk  free  rate.  But  poorly  designed  performance  sharing  rules  between 
pensioners and sponsors can lead to conflicts of interest and poor performance for both; the design 
of  adequate  sharing  rules  necessitates  an  understanding  of  the  associated  optimal  investment 
strategies.  
To  explore  suitable  performance  sharing  rules  we  consider  a  setting  similar  to  that  of  the 
Pensionskassen  in  Germany.  They  offer  a  guaranteed  minimum  return  on  contributions  and  a 
participation to the upside performance of the fund above the guaranteed minimum return on a 
yearly  basis. But  we  show  that  this  type  of  scheme  can  be  unattractive  to  both  investors  and 
sponsors. We find that a yearly performance sharing rule puts in direct conflict the interests of the 
pensioners and those of the fund managers. They would need to be revised to give managers a 
higher upside performance participation (at least 25% instead of the current 10%) as well as to keep 
the guaranteed minimum return well below the yearly risk free rate. Even so, this type of yearly 
performance sharing rule would still favor too much investment in low risk assets and therefore 
would still offer relatively poor returns to the pensioners. The returns for the pensioners would be 
only marginally improved by a more adapted dynamic, CPPI style, investment strategy. 
On the other hand, the returns for pensioners would be much more attractive if the performance 
sharing rule and the guaranteed minimum return on contributions were applied to the cumulative 
performance of the fund at maturity instead of yearly. A cumulative performance sharing rule gives 
greater incentive to the fund manager to invest in an asset mix offering a large Sharpe ratio and this 
improves the welfare of the pensioners as well. The main drawback of a cumulative rule is that it 
would expose pensioners to credit risks on fund managers. But this research shows that credit risks 
can  be  reduced  to  negligible  proportions  without  significant  loss  of  performance  if  managers 
implement dynamic, CPPI style, investment strategies. Regulators can ensure low credit risks by 
setting limits or penalties on the downside risks of managers. 
The design of performance sharing rules between pensioners and fund managers is complex. Rules 
designed  to  enhance  the  welfare  of  pensioners  may  have  the  opposite  effect  by  forcing  fund 
managers to adopt less beneficial investment strategies for pensioners. Pension Fund authorities ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
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should consider fostering schemes that guarantee minimum returns for pensioners and limit their 
exposures to defaults of managers, but they should primarily look for schemes that limit conflicts of 
interest  between  pensioners  and  sponsors  and  be  very  careful  in  setting  precise  parameters, 
especially  in  the  current  turbulent  financial  markets.  If  significant  conflicts  of  interest  can  be 
avoided, competition between fund managers and the desire to satisfy the specific needs of special 
groups of investors should be sufficient to determine the best parameters for guaranteed minimum 
return pension schemes within ranges approved by the authorities.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-10 
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